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936 ESupp. 1 (D. D.C. 1996)
United States District Court, District of Columbia
I. BACKGROUND
A. Claims
The plaintiffs, Black and Hispanic farmers who
applied for federal farm loans or sought federal assis-
tance with existing farm loans, brought an action against,
Daniel R. Glickman the Secretary of the Department of
Agriculture (USDA) claiming discrimination in connec-
tion with their loan applications.1 The plaintiffs made
claims under the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and claims
under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.2 The District
Court of the District of Columbia dismissed the plain-
tiff's claim under the Civil Rights Act of 1991 because it
could not be maintained under federal law, nor could
their Title VI claim proceed against a federal agency.
The plaintiffs originally brought claims for damages
and equitable relief based on the Fifth, Thirteenth, and
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution as well as a
series of claims based on several federal civil rights
statutes.4 The Secretary made a motion for judgment, in
part, on the pleadings.5 In his motion, the Secretary
claimed that sovereign immunity barred all of the plain-
tiffs' claims for damages. He further moved that the
plaintiffs' claims under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments, as well as those claims under 42 U.S.C. §§
1981 and 2000d, were _prohibited because they failed to
state a cause of action.
In response to the Secretary's motion, the plaintiffs
withdrew many of their claims for damages as well as
their claims under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments. 8 The plaintiffs then moved forward with
IWilliams v. Glickman, 939 E Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1996).
242 U.S.C. § 1981 (1991); 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. (1964).
3Williams, 939 ESupp. at 1.
4The plaintiffs based their claims on the following federal civil
rights statutes: 42 U.S.C. § 1981,42 U.S.C. § 1982, and 42 U.S.C. §
2000d.A claim under the Equal Credit OpportunityAct (ECOA), 15
U.S.C. § 1691, and a claim for fraud and misrepresentation.
Williams, 939 ESupp. at 1.
Id. at 3.
7Williams v. Glickman, 936 ESupp. 1,3 (D. D.C. 1996).The
secretaries motion did not effect the plaintiffs' claim for dam-
ages and equitable relief under the ECOA; and their equitable
relief claims based on the Fifth Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 1982,
and their claims for fraud and misrepresentation.
8Id. at 3.The plaintiffs withdrew their claims for damages
under the Fifth Amendment, their claim for damages under 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982, and their claims for damages for fraud
and misrepresentation.
their remaining claim for equitable relief under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.9
B. Facts
The plaintiffs applied for federal loan assistance pur-
suant to the Consolidated Farm and Rural Development
Act. This act empowers the Secretary of Agriculture to
make and insure loans to farmers and ranchers in the
United States." To qualify for the loan program, an appli-
cant must be a citizen of the United States, have training or
farming experience, operate a family farm, and be unable to
obtain credit elsewhere at reasonable rates and terms.12
The program was administered by the Farmers
Home Administration ("FmHA") under the authority of
the Secretary of Agriculture until 1994, when the FmHA
became the Consolidated Farms Service Agency.3 The
FmHA was authorized to make loans and guarantee14
financing to farmers and businesses in rural areas. The
loans were to be used for acquiring, enlarging, or improv-
ing farms, recreational uses and facilities, to supplement
farm income, to refinance existing indebtedness, and for
loan closings. The FmHA made loans directly to farmers
in certain instances, and guaranteed loans made by com-
mercial institutions in others.1
6
C. Historical
Since the 1920's the number of Black and minority
operated farms has been declining, from almost a million
in 1920 to less then 30,000 today.'7 During this period,
the FmHA did little to secure financing and loans to
9M7.
l07 U.S.C. § 1921 (1961).
7 U.S.C. § 1922 (1985).
Id.
137 U.S.C. § 6932 (1994). The Federal Crop Insurance
Reform and Department of Agriculture Reorganization Act of
1994 replaced the Farmers Home Administration with the
Consolidated Farms Service Agency.
147 U.S.C. § 1932(d) (1987). Rural areas are defined in the
statute as any place with a population of less than 50,000.
157 U.S.C. § 1923 (1981).
16
Williams v. Glickman, 936 E Supp. 1, 2 (D.D.C. 1996).
1
7U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, The Decline of Black
Farming in America (1983).The Commission's report examined
problems facing black farmers and the historical and current
conditions that have contributed to the loss of farmland operat-
ed by blacks.The number of black operated farms has declined
from about 925,000 in 1920 to less than 30,000 currently.
advance the cause minority farmers. In 1981 only 2.5
percent of the total dollar amount loaned throuh the
FmHA's credit programs went to black farmers. This
low level assistance to minority farmers has made the
FmHA and its practices the subject of criticism and final-
ly, this suit.19 The claims brought forth in this case arise
out of the FmHA's tenure over the USDA's federal assis-
tance program.The district court analyzed these claims.
II. HOLDING
The United States District Court for the District of
Columbia held that the plaintiffs' had no cause of action
under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 or Title VI for discrimination
based on race or national origin when deciding to grant20
federal loans or to insure private loans. The court made
its determination by looking at the language of both
statutes. Specifically, the court looked at subsection (c) of
42 U.S.C. § 1981 and concluded that the language in that
section was limited to discrimination by private entities
and under color of state law, but did not include dis-
crimination under federal law. The plaintiffs' Title VI
claims encountered a similar fate. When the court found
the language of Title VI did not apply to programs admin-
istered by federal agencies.
III. ANALYSIS/APPLICATION
A. 42 U.S.C. § 1981
What is now 42 U.S.C. § 1981 was introduced into
law as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.21 At that time
section 1981 operated as a general prohibition against
racial discrimination in the making and enforcement of22
contracts. In 1991, Congress supplemented 42 U.S.C. §
18131 CONG. REC. S16928 (daily ed. December 2, 1987)
(statement of Sen. Sanford). Senator Sanford's comments are in
reference to The Decline of Black Farming in America, a
report released by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, and a
report released in 1983 by the USDA task force on Black farm
ownership.
19USDA, CRAT Report, page 13 (1997). The USDA's Civil
Right Action Team released the "CRAT Report" in 1997, making
recommendations and determinations regarding the proce-
dures and practice of federal farm assistance program. It report-
ed that many minority farmers believed local officials imple-
menting loan assistance program abused their power by apply-
ing loan standards discriminatorily.
2°Williams, 936 E Supp. at 3.
2142 U.S.C. § 1981 (1866).
242 U.S.C. § 1981. Section 1981 stated,"All persons within
the jurisdiction of the United States shall have a right in every
state and territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be
parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all
laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property
as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like pun-
1981 so that it would also cover claims of discrimination
that arose from the contractual relationship between an
employer and an employee.23 The addition to § 1981 was
intended by Congress to expand the protections they felt
had been dramatically limited by the Supreme 
Court.24
Section (a) is the one above, and the two additional sec-
tions were titled (b) and (c).
Section 1981(b) defines the legislative meaning of
the words "make and enforce contracts" in section
1981(a) so as to make clear they reached situations
25
involving employment discrimination. Section 1981(c)
establishes the reach of § 1981. It states, "the rights pro-
vided by this section are protected against any impair-
ment by nongovernmental discrimination and impair-
ment under state law."26 Subsection (c) is intended to
codify the Supreme Court's holding in Runyon v.
McCray, that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 yrohibits private as well as
governmental discrimination.
The Secretary asserted that 42 U.S.C. § 1981(c) pro-
hibits the plaintiffs from pursuing their claim against the
FmHA. The language of section 1981(c) expressly refers
to governmental discrimination and discrimination
under color of state law, and does not mention discrimi-
nation under the color of federal law or entities estab-
lished under federal law."' Therefore, the plaintiffs are
barred from using 42 U.S.C. § 1981 to make claims of dis-
crimination against the FmHA in connection with their
federal loan application.
The plaintiffs never directly address the language of
section 1981, but instead look to the legislative history
and intent to find the meaning of that section.The plain-
tiffs contend: that the legislative intent of the amend-
ment was to expand the remedies available under §
1981; that before the 1991 amendments, the court per-
mitted section 1981 suits involving discrimination by the
ishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exaction's of every
kind, and to no other."
2342 U.S.C. § 1981 (1991).
24H.R. REP. No. 101-644, pt. 2, at 1 (1990). "Section 2.
Findings and Purpose of the Civil Rights Act of 1990 (a)
Findings (1) in a series of recent decisions addressing employ-
ment discrimination claims under Federal law, the Supreme
Court cut back dramatically on the scope and effectiveness of
civil rights protections. (b) Purposes (1) to respond to the
Supreme Court's recent decisions by restoring civil rights pro-
tections that were dramatically limited by those decisions."
25,d
2Id.
" Runyon v. McCray, 96 S.Ct. 2586 (1976). Runyon was a
case brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 for the alleged discrinii-
nation of black children in the admissions process of a private
school. In that case Justice Stewart held that § 1981 prohibited
private commercially operated, nonsectarian schools from
denying admission to prospective students because they are
Negroes.
28Williams, 936 F Supp. at 3.
federal government; and that the Congress could not
have intended the 1991 amendments to increase the
causes of action available under the statute, but at the
same time eliminate claims against the federal govern-29
ment A literal interpretation would result in a contrac-
tion of the statute's scope contrary to the intentions
expressed in its legislative history.
To analyze the viability of the plaintiff's claim under
§ 1981, the Court looked to the plain language of the
statute. The court states "that only rare and exceptional
circumstances will rebut the strong presumption that
the plain language of a statute expresses congressional
,130
intent." The court found that the plain language of sec-
tion 1981(c) excluded claims against federal agencies.
In the courts opinion the terms "nongovernmental"
and "under color of state law" in section 1981(c) exclu-
31
sively defined the extent of § 1981's application.
Subsection (c) expressly provided for actions against
state governments, while remaining silent as to the appli-32
cation of § 1981 to the federal government. Only if the
term "under color of state law" were viewed as sugges-
tive or illustrative could an intent to allow causes of
33
action against the federal government be implied.
The Court looked at these terms and found that they
were not suggestive or illustrative, but were limiting
terms. Citing the holding in Puerto Rico Maritime
Shipping Authority v. ICC, Judge Flannery said the
terms "including" and "for example" are used to set off a
list of illustrations or suggestions. The Court found the
word "includes" was used to begin a list of suggestions in
§ 1981(b), but no such language existed in § 1981(c).The
Court took the use of the term "includes" in § 1981(b),
and the absence of such language in § 1981(c) to imply
an intent by Congress to make suggestions in § 1981(b),
but not in § 1981(c).
3
1
Similarly the court rejected the pre-amendment
29Prior to the 1991 amendments the court had allowed
suits against the federal government under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
See NAACP v. Levi, 418 F Supp. 1109 (D. D.C. 1976);
Premachandra v. Mitt, 753 E2d 635 (8th Cir. 1985); City of
Milwaukee v. Saxbe, 546 E2d 693 (7th Cir. 1976); Baker v. F &
FInv. Co., 489 F2d 829 (7th Cir. 1973).
3Ardestani v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,
112 S.Ct. 515,520 (1991).
31Williams, 936 E Supp. at 4321d.33Id.
34Puerto Rico Maritime Shipping Authority v. ICC, 645
F2d 1102,1112 (D.C. 1981).3'Brown v. Gardner 115 S.Ct. 522, 555 (1994).
36See NAACP v. Levi, 418 ESupp. 1109,1117 (D. D.C. 1976);
Premachandra v. Mitts, 753 E2d 635,641 n. 7 (8th Cir. 1985);
City of Milwaukee v. Saxbe, 546 E2d 693,703 (7th Cir. 1976);
Baker v. F & F Inv. Co., 489 E2d 829,833 (7th Cir. 1973).
cases that had allowed actions against the federal gov-
ernment under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 . The court found the
subsequent amendments, and specifically the addition of
subsection (c) barred such suits under post-amendment
§ 1981. 37
The court rejected the plaintiffs' appeal to examine
the legislative history, saying that where the statutory
text is clear the court will not resort to the legislative his-38
tory to cloud that text. Although, the court agreed that
the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 indi-
cated an intent to expand civil rights, and that pre-1991
cases under § 1981 had allowed suits against the federal
government, it nonetheless concluded that the plain
meaning of the text of the 1991 amendments now
excludes such suits. For these reasons the court dis-
missed the plaintiff's claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.' 9
B. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
The plaintiffs also sought relief under the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 for alleged FmHA discrimination in
denying them participation in the USDA's federal farm
loan assistance program.The Civil Rights Act of 1964 or
40
Title VI , prohibits the exclusion from participation in
federally assisted programs on the grounds of race, color,
or national origin. Section 2000d provides that "No per-
son in the United States shall, on the ground of race,
color, or national origin, be excluded from participation
in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimi-
nation under any pro nam or activity receiving federal
financial assistance." The court agreed with the
Secretary that Title VI did not apply to programs directly
administered by federal agencies.
Plaintiffs cited several cases that permitted actions
against federal agencies for discrimination under Title
VI,43 and further looked to USDA's regulation to find
37Williams, 936 E Supp. at 4.
'Ratzlafv. United States, 114 S.Ct. 655,662 (1994).
39Williams, 936 E Supp. At 5. The court had to further
decide whether to allow the plaintiffs to seek declaratory relief
for conduct prior to the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of
1991. Because the alleged discriminatory conduct stopped
being actionable on November 21, 1991, the court found no
substantial controversy existed which would warrant the
issuance of a declaratory relief.





43Williams, 936 E Supp. at 4. See Young v. Pierce, 544 E
Supp. 1010 (E.D.Tex 1982); Gautreax v. Romney, 448 F 2d 731
(7th Cir. 1971); NAACP v. Brennan, 360 E Supp. 1006 (D. D.C.
1973); Freedom Republicans, Inc. v. Federal Election Comm 'n,
788 E Supp. 600 (D. D.C. 1992); Guardians Assoc. v. Civil
Service Comm'n, 103 S.Ct. 3221 (1983).
those regulations that expressly forbade race discrimina-
tion in programs like that administered by the FmHA.
The court ruled that Title VI did not by its plain
meaning apply to any program directly administered by
a federal agency.The court distinguished the cases cited
by the plaintiffs, because none of them considered the
statutory definitions at issue, nor did they permit Title VI
suits against directly administered federal programs.
The Court also discounted the Plaintiffs proffer of
4'
USDA regulations that prohibited race discrimination
because none of the regulations cited to the court pro-
vided for a cause of action under Title VI. In fact, Judge
Flannery correctly pointed out that the regulations cited
by the Plaintiffs specifically stated that they do not apply
46
to Title VI.
The Court when basing its opinion looked to the
definitions found in 42 U.S.C.§ 2000d-4a which define
"program" and "activity" as they are used in section
47
2000d. The court found that "program" and "activity"
referred only to those administered by state or local gov-
ernments, colleges and certain public systems of educa-
tion, certain corporations, and other entities established
by two or more of the entities mentioned." Directly
administered federal programs were not included in the
list used to define "program" or "activity"The Court pro-
hibited the plaintiffs from pursuing their cause of action
under Title VI because the plain meaning of the statuto-
rily defined terms "program" and "activity" did not pro-
vide for such an action against directly administered fed-
eral programs.
I. CONCLUSION
The plain meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1981(c) does not
encompass discrimination that may occur under federal
law.49 The plaintiffs obviously recognized this because
47 C.ER. § 15.51 provides that: "No agency, officer, or
employee of the USDA, shall exclude from participation in,
deny benefits of, or subject to discrimination any person in the
United States on the ground of race, color, religion, sex, age,
handicap, or national origin under and program or activity
administered by such agency, officer, or employee.
45
Id.
46Williams, 936 E Supp. at 6.
4742 U.S.C. § 2000d-4a.
48Williams, 936 E Supp. at 4.
4942 U.S.C. § 1981.
50Williams, 936 E Supp. at 3.
51H.R. REP. 101-644, pt. 2, at 1 (1990).
52In Patterson v. Mclean Credit Union, 109 S.Ct. 2363
(1989), the court narrowed the scope of section 1981 to dis-
they never directly attacked the literal translation of the
statute, but instead asked that the court to rely upon the
legislative history to give the statute meaning.50 The leg-
islative history of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 can be read to support
an expansive application of the statute. The Finding and
Purposes sections of the House Reports on the Civil
Rights Act of 1990 declares that the purpose of the act
and its amendments was to expand the coverage and
remedies available to those who face discrimination."'
The Act in sum was to restore and strengthen the reme-
dies under federal law that past Supreme Court decisions
had weakened' 2
The court in this situation is required to "presume
that a legislature says in a statute what it means and
means in a statute what it says."'3 The court also has the
function of interpreting a statue so as to construe the lan-
'4
guage in order to give effect to the intent of Congress.
The court then can be said to have the dual function of
obtaining the statutory meaning from the language, and
giving that language the effect that Congress intended. In
a perfect world the language of a statute would accu-
rately state the intent underlying its enactment.
However, in most cases the legislative history is open to
interpretations that the plain language of the statute
does not allow. In those instances the court is proper to
rely upon the plain meaning of the statute, and not its
legislative history.
This expansive view sustained by the legislative his-
tory was unpersuasive to the district court. In truth, the
court would not have had to reach far to fimd that section
1981's legislative history signaled an intent to permit
actions against the federal government. Indeed, case law
prior to the expansive 1991 amendments supported
actions under federal law using section 1981. The
amendments were then enacted to expand the power of
56
section 1981, and to broaden it scope.
crimination in the making and enforcement of contracts. The
legislature felt this interpretation of section 1981 was insuffi-
cient in protecting against racial discrimination in the contexts
of contracts. Specifically the performance aspect of the con-
tractual relationship was not covered.The Amendments to sec-
tion 1981 were intended to remedy this defect. Specifically sec-
tion (b) defined the making and enforcing of contracts to cover
performance as well.
53Connecticut National Bank v. M. German, 112 S.Ct.
1146, 1149 (1992).
5United States v.American TruckingASS'NS, Inc., 60 S.Ct.
1059,1063 (1940).55William, 936 E Supp. at 4.
5H.R. REP. No.101-644, pt. 2, at 1 (1990).
The District Court in Williams did not contradict
the strong support of expansion found in the legislative
57
history of section 1981. The court did not have to
because, the words of the statute outweighed any intent
that could be derived from its legislative history.5s The
words themselves gave a clear meaning to the statute
that does not need the legislative history for clarification.
The court has to make the presumption that the
plain meaning of the statute signifies Congress's intent."
The fact that many legislatures vote on the words of the
statute make such a principle of interpretation funda-
mental. The court cannot be expected to rewrite a
statute. Only when faced with a strong statutory ambi-
guity should the court assume the role of legislative his-
torian.
In this way the plain meaning doctrine provides
reassurance to the legislatures and to the people that the
court will not read its own biases into clearly worded
statutes. The doctrine also serves as a warning to
Congress to closely scrutinize the structure and wording
of the statutes that it creates.The court should never be
asked to delve into house and senate debates to deter-
mine the meaning of clearly worded laws. Such a request
is in essence an attempt to make the court and not the
statute ultimate arbiter of what the legislature intends.
Only when faced with a strong statutory ambiguity
should the court assume such a role.
That type of ambiguity does not exist in the wording
of 42 U.S.C. § 1981(c). The language simply does not
include federal law. The wording is clear, and even if it
were not the legislative history does not explicitly con-6o
tradict the courts interpretation. All that the legislative
57Williams, 936 E Supp at 4.
58
Id.
59Connecticut National Bank v. M. German, 112 S.Ct.
1146,1149 (1992).60H.R. REP No. 101-644, at 1 (1990).
61
Id.
history implies is that section (c) is to apply to public dis-
crimination as well as governmental discrimination.6'The
language of section 1981 does not need to be clouded by
a legislative history that only signals a desire by Congress
to expand the protections available under the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, but does not expressly set limits on
62
that expansion.
In examining the plaintiffs Title VI claim the court
had statutory definitions that supported its interpreta-
tion of the statute. 63 The presence of those definitions
effectively eliminated programs administered by federal
agencies from the coverage of Title VI Furthermore, the
cases cited by the plaintiffs to support their contentions
that Title VI applied to programs administered by the fed-
eral agencies were insufficient to support that point.6'
Those cases neither dealt with nor allowed causes of
action under Title VI against federally administered pro-
grams.
In light of the opinion of the District court it would
appear that a major portion of the Civil Rights Act of
1991 and Title VI do not apply to discrimination under
federal law. By properly deferring to the plain meaning of
the statute over the legislature history the court provides
a broad exemption to the federal government. This may
have in fact been Congress true intentions. If Congress
did intend to allow a remedial avenue of action against
the federal government in section 1981 and Title VI they
have fair warning to draft revisions that clearly state that
intent.
Summary and Analysis Prepared by:
Brandon Marzo
62Williams, 936 E Supp. at 5.
6342 U.S.C. § 2000d-4a. did not refer to federal agencies.
64Williams, 936 E Supp. at 5.65 d. Those cases did not construe the statutory definitions
at issue, nor did any of them permit Title VI suits involving
directly administered federal programs.
